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JED S. RAKOFF, WHY THE INNOCENT PLEAD GUILTY AND THE
GUILTY GO FREE: AND OTHER PARADOXES OF OUR BROKEN LEGAL
SYSTEM, Farrar, Strauss & Giroux 2021. Pp. 208. $27.00 Hardcover.
As its title suggests, Why the Innocent Plead Guilty and the
Guilty Go Free is a wide-ranging critique of our criminal justice system. 1
While it is hardly the first, it offers a number of distinctive insights.
Most of the now voluminous work on this topic is written by scholars,
policy analysts, or journalists and is addressed to the legislature or the
executive. 2 This certainly makes sense. External observers are wellpositioned to critique a system that punishes without purpose, and the
major determinants of its dysfunction are the legislature that enacts
the criminal law and the executive that enforces it. In contrast, the
author of this book, Jed S. Rakoff, is a sitting federal judge, and he
provides a specifically judicial perspective. 3 This appears in at least two
of the book’s most notable features: its juxtaposition of its subject
matter and its discussion of the way that general trends in our criminal
law impact the work of judges. 4
The study of American criminal law and criminal justice divides,
very roughly, into two basic categories. One is discussion of trial
procedures: the elements of particular crimes, the methods of proof, the
quality of the evidence, and the protections afforded to defendants. The
other consists of the administrative features of the criminal justice
*
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1.
JED S. RAKOFF, WHY THE INNOCENT PLEAD GUILTY AND THE GUILTY GO FREE: AND OTHER
PARADOXES OF OUR BROKEN LEGAL SYSTEM (2021).
2.
See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS (2020).
3.
RAKOFF, supra note 1, at 4.
4.
Id. at 4–5, 17–18.
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system as a whole: police, prisons, probation, and parole. The first
category tends to be the preserve of legal scholars and teachers. 5 As
scholars, they have certainly extended their attention to the second
category—an aspect of the increasingly interdisciplinary character of
legal research—but as teachers they continue to focus on trial
procedures. 6 The 1L Criminal Law course is heavily devoted to the
elements of crime that must be proved at trial, while the one upper class
course on the criminal justice system that most law students feel
obligated to take is Criminal Procedure. Other topics tend to be covered,
if at all, in upper class “boutique” classes. The second category of
criminal law and justice is the primary focus of criminologists and social
scientists more generally, who tend to be reluctant to plunge into the
thickets of legal doctrine or who consider it unimportant to do so. 7
Judge Rakoff, who had extensive experience as a prosecutor
before his appointment to the bench, succeeds in combining the
doctrinal and institutional perspectives. 8 With respect to doctrine, he
offers telling criticisms of the evidence admitted in criminal cases. 9
Eyewitness testimony is notoriously unreliable due to people’s faulty
memories and susceptibility to suggestion. 10 Blind management of
lineups and photo arrays can help, but cannot turn resentful or

5.
See. e.g., KATHERINE BECKETT & THEODORE SASSON, THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE: CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (2d ed. 2004); RUTH WILSON GILMORE, THE GOLDEN GULAG:
PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA (2007) (discussing
imprisonment in terms of politics, economics, and geography); JEFFREY REIMAN & PAUL LEIGHTON,
THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON (12th ed. 2020) (describing criminal justice

system in terms of general principles of class stratification).
6.
See, e.g., SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & RACHEL E. BARKOW, CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS (10th ed. 2016) (chapter headings are: Institutions
and Processes; The Justification of Punishment; Defining Criminal Conduct–The Elements of
Punishment; Rape; Homicide; The Significance of Resulting Harm; Group Criminality;
Exculpation; Theft Offenses; Discretion); PAUL MARCUS, LINDA A. MALONE, CARA H. DRINAN &
WILLIAM W. BERRY III, CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 2020) (chapter headings are: The Province and
Limits of the Criminal Law; The Decision to Punish; The Act Requirement; The Mental State;
Parties to Crimes; Principal Offenses; The Inchoate Offenses; Defenses); JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT
WEISBERG & GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (9th ed. 2021) (chapter
headings are: The Purposes and Limits of Punishment; The Criminal Act; The Guilty Mind;
Causation; Intentional Homicide; Unintentional Homicide; Capital Murder and the Death Penalty;
Defensive Force, Necessity, and Duress; Mental Illness as a Defense; Attempt: Complicity;
Conspiracy; Rape; Theft Offenses; Perjury, False Statements, and Obstruction of Justice). This is
not to suggest that these books entirely ignore issues such as policing, prisons, alternative
punishment or the organization of public defender services, and certainly not that the various
authors are unaware of these issues. Rather, the topics covered reflect the long-established and
deeply ensconced curriculum of the first year criminal law course.
7.
See supra note 5.
8.
RAKOFF, supra note 1, at 4–5.
9.
Id. at 35–36.
10. Id. at 35–45.
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overwrought victims into experienced observers. 11 So-called forensic
science is often decidedly unscientific, and thereby subject to
manipulation by result-oriented prosecutors or crime labs. 12 While tests
matching hair samples, clothing fibers, handwriting, and bitemarks are
regularly relied upon by prosecutors, rigorous analysis reveals that they
are often worse than nothing because they produce a false sense of
certainty. 13 Even fingerprint analysis, the most venerable and widely
used method of this sort, often depends on subjective interpretations of
the data. 14 Polygraph tests are so unreliable that they are typically
inadmissible. 15 Modern “brain science” offers a test of veracity based on
firmer theoretical foundations and much more expensive machinery
(the fMRI), but it cannot achieve the requisite level of reliability, at
least so far. 16 The standard that the Supreme Court developed to
determine the admissibility of scientific and other expert testimony in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. is more sophisticated
than prior standards but it is thereby virtually unusable in
ordinary cases. 17
A particularly disconcerting indication of these evidentiary
inaccuracies is the surprisingly frequent reversal of convictions in death
penalty cases. 18 The defendant is granted the most elaborate procedural
protections when this ultimate sanction is demanded, so much so that
execution often costs the state more than imprisoning the offender for
life. 19 Yet the Innocence Project has obtained reversals in a number of
these cases by demonstrating that the prosecutor convicted the wrong
person. 20 On the basis of this level of inaccuracy, Judge Rakoff reports,
he held the death penalty unconstitutional, but the Second Circuit
reversed him. 21
The second category of criminal justice research involves the
structure of the system and focuses on police, punishment, and the
institutional behavior of prosecutors, rather than their performance at
trial. Here again, Judge Rakoff advances a number of significant and

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 38–42.
Id. at 57–70.
Id. at 57, 61.
Id. at 61–62.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 78–79.
Id. at 59–61; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
RAKOFF, supra note 1, at 54.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 55.
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severe critiques. 22 The book begins with an account of what he describes
as the “scourge” of mass incarceration. 23 The scale is well known: more
than two million Americans are in prison, a higher rate per capita rate
than any other nation in the world. 24 The inequality is also well known:
forty percent of those currently incarcerated are African American, with
many serving time for nonviolent crimes. 25 Judge Rakoff concedes that
there has been a notable decline in crime rates during the past two
decades, and that some criminologists attribute this to our high levels
of incarceration, operating either as a deterrent or a means of
incapacitation. 26 But he also cites the work of other criminologists who
argue that incarceration was not responsible for the decline. 27 The
upshot is that we simply do not know. 28 In the face of this uncertainty,
however, we have chosen a response that has enormous costs for the
individuals who are serving excessively long sentences, for public
budgets that must pay for this exceptionally expensive strategy, and for
the minority families and communities that have been devastated by
having so many of their members dragged away for long periods of time
and returned as brutalized or broken people. 29
Prosecutors, viewed from an institutional perspective, are a
related source of concern. Many defendants, and particularly minority
defendants, lack the resources to retain an attorney, and are therefore
represented by public defenders. 30 However conscientious they are—
and this obviously varies—they can rarely match the resources of a
prosecutor who typically has in hand a police report, witness
statements, and those forensic tests whose inaccuracies make them
appear more intimidating than is justified. 31 This intrinsic imbalance
is greatly amplified by the array of weapons that legislatures have
granted prosecutors through the proliferation of offenses and
increasingly harsh sentences that they have imposed. 32 It is further
amplified by indigent defendants’ inability to post bail, so that a lengthy
22. Id. at 7–34.
23. Id. at 7–18.
24. Id. at 7.
25. Id. at 8.
26. Id at 7–8.
27. Id. at 9–12.
28. Id. at 9.
29. Id. at 12.
30. NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNS. COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF
OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 49–101 (2009); Heather Baxter, Gideon’s Ghost:
Providing the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel in Times of Budgetary Crisis, 2010 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 341, 349–51; Rebecca Marcus, Racism in Our Courts: The Underfunding of Public Defenders
and Its Disproportionate Impact Upon Racial Minorities, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219 (1994).
31. See RAKOFF, supra note 1, at 24.
32. Id. at 22–23.
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trial would subject them to the very conditions they are trying to
avoid. 33 Mandatory minimums obviously make the situation worse, and
sentencing guidelines do not make it any better. 34 The result, Judge
Rakoff writes, is that prosecutors can compel hapless defendants to
accept plea bargains instead of going to trial, thereby achieving a high
conviction rate at limited expense. 35 At present, some ninety-seven
percent of cases are plea bargained, Judge Rakoff reports. 36 This
process creates a conveyor belt that gathers up arrestees, speeds them
past the protections that trial is supposed to provide, and deposits them
in prison, thereby turning what should be an exceptional sanction into
mass incarceration.
But Judge Rakoff’s institutional critiques seem to conflict with
his concerns about the quality of evidence. If so many cases are plea
bargained, why be concerned with the remaining three percent that go
to trial? If, moreover, the prosecutor’s ability to “bludgeon” the
defendant into a disadvantageous bargain results from the defendant’s
reliance on public defenders and inability to post bail, then many of
those three percent are likely to be wealthy individuals, the small
minority already favored by the system in a variety of other ways, as
Judge Rakoff notes. 37 It might be argued that plea bargaining must be
carried out “in the shadow of the law,” and that stricter controls on the
evidence provided in trials will translate into advantages for the
defendant at the plea bargaining stage. 38 But with such a small portion
of defendants going to trial, 39 that shadow has become too attenuated
to exercise much influence. 40
The theme that connects the book’s doctrinal and institutional
concerns is an underlying attitude that Judge Rakoff reveals in his
accounts of his own judicial role. We are a society that has based its
governmental system upon the value of liberty. Yet we deprive our
citizens of liberty in a mood of self-righteous severity that allows
33. Id. at 29.
34. Id. at 22–23.
35. Id. at 25–31.
36. Id. at 20.
37. Id. at 85–101.
38. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 31–32 (1966); Thomas
W. Church, Jr., In Defense of “Bargain Justice”, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 509, 512–14, 523 (1979);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 309–17
(1983); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 66–69 (1971).
39. See RAKOFF, supra note 1, at 20.
40. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of the Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463 (2004); Shawn D. Bushway & Allison D. Redlich, Is Plea Bargaining in the “Shadow of Trial”
a Mirage?, 28 J. QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY 437 (2012); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and
Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004).
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executions that our fellow democracies abhor, and yields an
incarceration rate unmatched by any other nation, democratic or
authoritarian. 41 We convict defendants on the basis of invalid
evidence, 42 relying on the scrutiny of the adversary process that
functions only for the wealthiest defendants. 43 We compel plea
bargains, 44 introduce evidence at trials and impose savage punishment
with the certainty that we are right, when in fact we are so often
wrong 45—wrong about the person we are punishing 46 or wrong about
the level of punishment that is needed to achieve our purposes. 47 Of
course, there are real criminals, and of course they should be punished
in some way. But, recognizing that liberty is among our most treasured
values, we should approach the potential deprivation of a person’s
liberty with a sense of humility, hesitation, and perhaps even
trepidation. Those who manage the criminal justice system should
interrogate themselves about the validity of their actions, and always
remain open to the possibility that they are making a mistake.
Judges, the book suggests, can play a central role in
instantiating a more self-reflective approach to criminal justice. They
should be skeptical about the evidence introduced at trial, ready to
exclude eyewitness testimony obtained by slovenly methods, 48 to warn
jurors about the limitations of human perception and recollection, 49 and
to reject overeager, unsubstantiated assertions based on the developing
field of brain science. 50 They should have a role in monitoring plea
bargaining, meeting separately with the prosecutor and defense
attorney and then framing a recommendation about the proper
outcome. 51 (To preserve the trial judge’s objectivity, Judge Rakoff
suggests that this monitoring function be carried out by a different
judge, or possibly a magistrate appointed by the judge). 52 Judges should
be able to bring this same sense of skepticism to prosecutors’ demands
for maximum or excessively long sentences, and the legislature should
never deprive judges of this role by enacting mandatory minimums. 53
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See RAKOFF, supra note 1, at 19, 27.
Id. at 35–46, 57–84.
Id. at 85–101.
Id. at 25–31.
Id. at 35–46, 57–84.
Id.
Id. at 22–23.
Id. at 35–46.
Id.
Id. at 71–84.
Id. at 32–33.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 31–32.
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A second theme in Judge Rakoff’s book is the way that general
trends in our criminal law impact the work of judges. The book refers
to several such trends, but the most notable one is collective fear or
panic. Unfortunately, democratic government does not provide
adequate protection against this reaction. A genuine concern,
demanding a solution based on the public debate and conscientious
representation of the people’s views, can be transformed into collective
panic by the populace’s passing mood, or by political entrepreneurs who
use the Schumpeterian process of electoral competition for their
personal advancement. 54 This is what happened during World War II,
when legitimate concerns about espionage led to the internment of
250,000 Americans of Japanese descent, while the loyalty of tens of
millions of Americans with German and Italian origins went
unquestioned. 55 It happened again after World War II, when an
exaggerated fear of Communism led us to betray our basic principles
and punish people for their political opinions. 56 That same panic led us
into a catastrophic war that cost us nearly 60,000 fatalities and untold
billions against a small southeast Asian nation that not only posed no
threat to us but wanted to be our ally—and really had to be our ally in
geopolitical terms—because it decided to nationalize its paltry
industries and collectivize its little farms. 57
One contemporary example to which Judge Rakoff alerts us in
this book is the so-called War on Terror. 58 Obviously, the attack on the
World Trade Center demanded a response on our part. To some extent,
that response consisted of a rational extension of our established modes
of governance. 59 We organized a new administrative agency to
coordinate our efforts to protect ourselves, we strengthened the
surveillance capacities of existing law enforcement agencies such as the
Federal Bureau of Investigations and the New York City Police and Fire

54. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269–83 (3d ed.
1950).
55. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding constitutionality of the
internment); see e.g., TETSUDEN KASHIMA, JUDGMENT WITHOUT TRIAL: JAPANESE AMERICAN
IMPRISONMENT DURING WORLD WAR II (2004); RICHARD REEVES, INFAMY: THE SHOCKING STORY
OF THE JAPANESE INTERNMENT IN WORLD WAR II (2015).
56. RAKOFF, supra note 1, at 135; see, e.g., DAVID CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR: THE ANTICOMMUNIST PURGE UNDER TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER (1978); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS
TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME: FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM
311–426 (2004).
57. See, e.g., FRANCES FITZGERALD, FIRE IN THE LAKE: THE VIETNAMESE AND THE AMERICANS
IN VIETNAM (1972); STANLEY KARNOW, VIETNAM: A HISTORY (rev. ed. 1997).
58. RAKOFF, supra note 1, at 127–37.
59. Cf. id.
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Departments, and we punished the perpetrator of the attack. 60 These
responses have proved to be effective and testify to our strength and
competence as a democratic nation.
But panic, perhaps triggered by the initial failure to prevent the
attack, an abiding hostility to modern administrative government, and
racism (contrast our response to Timothy McVeigh’s bombing of the
Oklahoma City Federal Building and the January 6 assault on the
Capitol) 61 led us to betray our principles. As Judge Rakoff documents,
we established a horrific prison outside our national boundaries and
intentionally separated from our legal system. We tortured suspects
with methods that violated both our treaty obligations and our
standards of due process. We criminalized political speech that fell into
a vaguely defined category of being “in coordination with” any terrorist
organization, including ethnic liberation movements that posed no
threat to us and in one case (the Kurds) had been our ally. 62 There is no
indication than any of these abuses have been effective; coerced
confessions, for example, have been known for many centuries to
provide unreliable information. 63 Panic, it would seem, has induced us
to engage in illegal activity under the misimpression that our principles
weaken us, and that immoral action makes us strong. 64
A second case of panic is the one that constitutes this book’s
primary theme, which is our response to the increase in crime during
the 1960s and 70s. 65 We cannot be faulted for demanding a response to
this situation, but the mechanisms for responding, that is, standard
provisions of criminal law, were already established in American law. 66
60. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, codified in 6 U.S.C.
ch. 1 § 101; GWEN HOLDEN, ET AL., LEARNING FROM 9/11: ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IN THE NEW
YORK CITY AND ARLINGTON COUNTY, VA., POLICE DEPARTMENTS (2009) (sponsored by the National
Institute of Justice); Bruce Dearstyne, The FDNY on 9/11: Information and Decision Making in
Crisis, 24 GOV. INFO. Q. 29 (2007); Holly Ventura Miller, J. Mitchell Miller & Mathieu Deflem,
Governmentality and the War of Terror: FBI Project Carnivore and the Diffusion of Disciplinary
Power, 13 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 55 (2005).
61. See LOU MICHEL & DAN HERBECK, AMERICAN TERRORIST: TIMOTHY MCVEIGH AND THE
OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING (2001); RICHARD A. SERRANO, ONE OF OURS: TIMOTHY MCVEIGH AND
THE OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING (1998).
62. RAKOFF, supra note 1, at 128–35.
63. Id. at 128–29.
64. See STONE, supra note 56 (documenting the extent to which the U.S. commitment to free
speech has crumbled during every major war); Sahar F. Aziz, Caught in a Preventive Dragnet:
Selective Counter-Terrorism in a Post-9/11 America, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 429 (2011); John Mueller &
Mark G. Stewart, The Terrorism Delusion: America’s Overwrought Response to September 11, 37
INT’L SEC. 81 (2012). For Fascists, this is a necessary rather than undesirable reaction. See CARL
SCHMITT, DICTATORSHIP (Michael Hoelzl & Graham Ward trans., 2014)
65. RAKOFF, supra note 1, at 13–15.
66. See id. at 15 (discussing how laws passed in response to high crime may not have helped
the problem).
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Further responses were an expression of collective panic, ignited and
enflamed by unscrupulous political leaders. 67 The public was inundated
with frenzied accounts of “super-predator” adolescents, highly
organized nationwide gangs, drug-crazed habitual offenders, and
remorseless African American revolutionaries. 68 As a result,
rehabilitation, the guiding principle for conscientious corrections
officials and the moderating force for prisons as institutions was
rejected in favor of retribution. 69 Sentences that were already
sufficiently or excessively severe were repeatedly lengthened through
direct “enhancement” and mandatory minimums as politicians
competed for the reputation of being “tough on crime.” 70 The Prison
Litigation Reform Act constrained the discretion of federal judges to
decide challenges to conditions of confinement, 71 while the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act limited the ability of
state prisoners to obtain federal habeas corpus review of
their convictions. 72
Judge Rakoff argues that both these panic reactions inadvisably
restricted the discretion of judges. 73 This raises a question about why
such restrictions were imposed. For the most part, judges are respected
figures; in any case, they are rarely the targets of widespread political
hostility unless they are handing down a major constitutional decision
with far-reaching implications. 74 It was terrorists and criminals that
the populace feared, not judges. Perhaps the reason that responses to
these fears so often involved limits on judicial decisionmaking is related
to the essential role of the judge in our legal system. Judges, by image
and often in reality, represent deliberation and reflection. At the federal
level, they are insulated from the political process by job tenure, salary
protections, and a panoply of legal rules and established norms against
ex parte contacts and similar intrusions on their decision making
process. 75 The purpose of these protections is to separate judges from
67. See id. (discussing political backlash against high crime rates).
68. Id. at 8, 12.
69. Id. at 14–15; see MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND
THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 252–71 (1999); Edward L.
Rubin, Just Say No to Retribution, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 17 (2003).
70. Id. at 13–18, 32.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1996); see John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: The New
Face of Court Stripping, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 429 (2001).
72. RAKOFF, supra note 1, at 122–24; see Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes
and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1 (1997).
73. RAKOFF, supra note 1, at 13–14.
74. See id. at 16 (federal judges are unelected and publicly well regarded).
75. Id.
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the clamor of political controversy, to create a secure space where they
can consider issues calmy and engage in thoughtful and sustained
analysis. When fear takes hold, however, people turn to simplistic and
unqualified responses. Thus, political leaders, in their haste to induce
or capitalize on excessive fear of terrorism and crime, have enacted
measures to replace careful distinctions with categorical punishments
and to foreclose critical re-evaluation by means of inflexible rules. 76
How should judges respond to these attacks on their
decisionmaking role? As Judge Rakoff concedes, the executive and the
legislature have the primary responsibility for making public policy,
and the legislature sets the rules that judges are supposed to follow. 77
The institutional insulation of judges, and the expectation that they
remain neutral and apolitical, further constrains their range of action.
Nonetheless, the judiciary can play an important role in combatting
panic-driven decisionmaking that betrays our guiding principles. Judge
Rakoff argues that constitutional courts have been excessively
deferential, particularly to the executive branch. 78 Moreover, by
erecting barriers to review such as the standing and political question
doctrines, the Supreme Court has subtracted itself from the
governmental process in a number of important areas where its voice
might have made a difference. 79 In the most notable administrative law
decision of the current era, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 80 the Supreme Court held that federal courts
should adopt a deferential stance toward agencies on matters of
statutory interpretation. 81
I would take issue with Judge Rakoff on Chevron, which I think
embodies a profound insight about the centrality of statutory
interpretation by the agency in the administrative process. 82 But I
agree with the underlying point that judges should not relinquish their
important role; I would recommend that they do so by enforcing
administrative law principles more vigorously, particularly when the
agency circumvents the notice and comment process that can provide
the agency with useful information, or when it fails to enforce legally
mandatory regulations, as was common during the Trump

76. Id. at 13–18.
77. Id. at 119–25.
78. Id. at 139–52.
79. Id. at 157–59.
80. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
81. RAKOFF, supra note 1, at 159.
82. See Edward L. Rubin, Auer, Chevron and the Future of Kisor, 48 FLA. STATE L. REV. 719,
735–47 (2021).
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Administration. 83 More generally, with regard to panic-driven public
policies like the so-called wars on terror and crime, Judge Rakoff is
exactly right about the judges’ obligation to fight back against executive
and legislative efforts to curtail their discretionary role. 84 They can do
so through judicial decisions that construe such efforts narrowly, or—
when doctrinally possible—to hold them unconstitutional. They can
also do so by public statements that alert citizens to the dangers of
eliminating judgment and reflection from the governmental process.
These dangers are likely to be much greater than any incremental value
(often non-existent or negative) that results from categorical or
automatic punishments and prohibitions. In taking such actions, the
judiciary is not being partisan or overly “political.” Rather, it is
championing the value of judgment as an antidote to panic, and thereby
reasserting its own long-established role in our governmental system.

83. See Edward L. Rubin & Joanna K. Sax, Administrative Guidance and Genetically
Modified Food, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 539, 564–86 (2018).
84. RAKOFF, supra note 1, at 119–25.

